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INTRODUCTION
The paper is based on my experiences as a Sri Lankan born expatriate-academic, researching into
post-tsunami leadership behaviour. I interviewed formal and informal donors, civil society
leaders, business leaders and victims of the Asian tsunami. This paper aims to report the findings
related to the genuineness of tsunami related corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities of
two leading Sri Lankan private sector organisations. In the aftermath of a high magnitude human
tragedy and amidst stakeholders’ overwhelming outpouring of spontaneity to engage in CSR
activities, the paper addresses decision-making challenges in shaping the intent and extent of the
CSR initiatives. I adopt Våland and Heide’s (2005) conceptual model, and examine virtuousness
as a necessary condition of genuineness in tsunami related CSR initiatives.
Våland and Heide (2005) examined how a company can handle ‘bad episodes’ related to
corporate social responsibility. Depending on the significance of the episode, Våland and Heide
(2005) outline three responsive strategies which will be discussed later in detail. Noting that
Våland and Heide’s (2005) views were limited to company created ‘bad episodes’, the present
study extends their model to explain CSR initiatives to externally caused ‘bad episodes’ affecting
the whole community.
The rest of the paper develops as follows. I start with an introduction to basic concepts,
and the state of CSR in Sri Lanka before the Asian tsunami. Thereafter, I continue with the
methodology and case descriptions. The subsequent section includes findings and then, a
discussion on findings. Finally, I turn to implications and concluding thoughts.
The concept of corporate social responsibility has a long and impressive history in the
management literature (Windsor, 2001; Carroll, 1999 and 1979). Conceptually, Windsor (2001)
notes that there are significant difficulties in distinguishing whether business behavior is truly
moral conduct or instrumental adoption of an appearance of moral conduct as useful reputational
strategy. He argues that voluntary acceptance of material loss may serve to identify moral
conduct, but material gain cannot serve to isolate reputational strategy. Empirically, despite
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considerable effort in the academic literature to discover a reliable relationship between
responsible conduct and financial performance, the evidence remains mixed at best (Windsor,
2001).
More recently, the genuineness or moral intent in corporate philanthropy has caught the
attention of researchers (Bright, 2006; Godfrey, 2005). Briefly, genuineness can be explained as
the “perception that an organization’s philanthropic activities are well intentioned and not merely
for instrumental gains” (Bright, 2006, p. 752). The idea of genuineness is particularly relevant to
CSR activities because consistent CSR activities could generate moral capital by promoting
corporate reputation (Bright, Cameron and Caza, 2006; Cameron, Bright and Caza, 2004). Moral
capital can act as a social license, a form of insurance against unforeseen risks to corporate image,
reputation or profits (Godfrey, 2006). We return to this discussion later in the paper.
According to Bright (2006), virtuousness is necessary for genuineness in corporate
philanthropy. Bright, Cameron and Caza (2006) assert that virtuousness is a form of character
excellence that can be attributed not only to individuals but to organisations. They identify three
key definitional attributes of organisational virtuousness; human impact, moral goodness and
unconditional societal benefit (p.251). Human impact is the effect CSR activities have on
improving the living conditions, well-being and the resilience of beneficiaries. The moral
goodness is based on the conception of ‘character traits in people and organisations that are seen
as desirable’ (Bright, 2006, p.753). The last attribute, unconditional societal benefit is the
‘intention to create goods of first intent and to prudently use goods of second intent to
instrumentally bring benefit to society’ (ibid). Organisations demonstrating this attribute would
initiate CSR activities because it was the ‘right thing to do’.
This paper attempts to examine the genuineness in Unilever (Sri Lanka) and Brandix’s
CSR initiatives following the tsunami disaster. These two cases are selected due to several
reasons. Unilever (Sri Lanka)’s parent company, Unilever Plc, is one of the world’s leading
suppliers of fast-moving consumer goods. The Sri Lankan subsidiary is among the largest and
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oldest multinational companies in Sri Lanka. It has operated in Sri Lanka for over 70 years and
employs over 1100. Brandix is the single largest exporter in Sri Lanka with an annual turnover
exceeding US$200 million. It directly employs 18,500 and generates indirect employment to an
equivalent number. The company’s commitment to preserving the environment is demonstrated
by many national and international accolades including the Sri Lankan Presidential
Environmental Excellence Award (2005) and the American Apparel and Footwear Association’s
Excellence in Social Responsibility Award (2006). The pioneering post-tsunami social and
environmental rehabilitation relief efforts of these two organisations had a significant impact on
the Sri Lankan community, donor agencies such as United Nations, the Sri Lankan government
and other leading local and overseas businesses. Before we turn to the events that unfolded in
these two Sri Lankan business organisations in the aftermath of the tsunami, it would be useful to
note the state of CSR in Sri Lanka before the tsunami.

THE STATE OF CSR IN SRI LANKA BEFORE THE TSUNAMI
The Asian tsunami has resulted in a mass launch of hundreds of formal CSR programmes in the
Sri Lankan private sector. Commerce in Sri Lanka is a product of the occupation by Western
powers—the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the British—as well as the influence of neighbouring
India, a caste system and national cultural values. Privatisation, the opening of Sri Lanka to
foreign investment and increased domestic private investment have transformed Sri Lanka’s
private sector into the country’s largest employer (International Alert, 2005). With a per capita
income of over US$ 1000, Sri Lanka has attracted several Fortune500 companies which have
located their regional offices in this country (Asian Tribune, 2005).
In the first half of 2004, a comprehensive survey was undertaken by an international
NGO, International Alert, on the CSR perceptions and attitudes of the Sri Lankan public and
business organisations. The study explores perceptions on the wider social role of business in
society and looks at CSR as a possible means to develop this role. This study consisted of two
parts. The first, an island-wide household survey on the perceptions of the public on CSR. This

4

survey was conducted with the aid of a semi-structured questionnaire, administered through faceto-face interviews with individuals from all age categories between 18 to 65 years, including both
men and women.
The second study, also conducted with the aid of a semi-structured questionnaire, was
administered through face-to-face interviews with individuals from the business community. A
total of 147 individuals from the business community were interviewed. In the capital of
Colombo, the sample was selected to represent large-scale and prominent business organisations
covering 10 specific industrial sectors. International Alert’s findings provide a snapshot of the
state of the CSR in Sri Lanka before the tsunami.
When asked from the Sri Lankan public whether they had heard of the concept of CSR,
76.2% of respondents were aware of the concept, but 23.8% had never heard of it (International
Alert, 2005). The study shows that 54.7% of the respondents interviewed agreed that largescale/prominent businesses’ sole responsibility was to generate profits. But a significant
proportion (28.8%) disagreed, 9.6% were undecided and 6.5% said they did not know. The study
indicates that most Sri Lankans do not have a clear understanding of the role they wish businesses
to play in society (International Alert, 2005). The public is uncertain whether business should
focus solely on profits, or engage in social issues. While a slight majority of people feel that
business should do more for the social good, they mistrust corporations and express fears that the
private sector exploits consumers and destroys cultural values.
On the other hand, in the business community, most respondents feel that they have a
strong role to play in addressing social needs but, while there is a long history of charitable giving
in Sri Lanka, few companies have a strategy or policy for doing so. They do not have a clear
direction on how and what to contribute to society, and the benefits from doing so.
Only 73.2% of companies surveyed had a CSR policy. When those with a CSR policy
were asked whether it was formal or informal, only 17% had formal, written policies. The
majority (84.1%) of the companies are engaged in CSR because they genuinely want to

5

contribute to the betterment of society, while 39% wanted to help build employee pride and
commitment. 26.8% said CSR is part of their company mission; 13.4% say they adopt it for
publicity reasons; 12.2% say it is because of the expectations of other businesses and civil
society; and 2.4% said it is because of regulations and laws (International Alert, 2005).
When asked how long their organisations have been involved in specific
(formal/informal) CSR policies, only 59.8% of companies have been actively involved for more
than six years. Seven organisations have had CSR policies running for more than 30 years and
one has been involved in the concept for 65 years. The majority of organisations engage in CSR
activities relating to education (54.9%) but significant numbers focus on internal practices, such
as employee welfare (51.2%) and unemployment issues (48.8%). A notable number of
organisations engage in religious activities (36.6%), environmental concerns (31.7%), health
(30.5%) and the provision of infrastructure facilities (28%).
Thus International Alert’s (2005) study reveals that while businesses regard the practice
of CSR as a genuine gesture, the public views it as self-interest. The majority of businesses say
the main reason for their CSR policies is genuine concern for society, but a minority cites
publicity as the primary purpose. The majority public view, by contrast, is that businesses practise
CSR policies for motives of publicity and only a minority believe that they have a genuine
concern for society.
Given this backdrop, and while the International Alert’s study was literally being
published for a January 2005 release, the Asian tsunami struck almost 70% of Sri Lanka’s
coastline on December 26, 2004. The estimated tsunami death toll ranges from 156,000 to
178,000 across 11 nations, with an additional 26,500 to 142,000 missing, most of them presumed
dead (Liu et al., 2005). The tsunami devastated 1,000 km of Sri Lanka’s coastline leaving 31,000
Sri Lankans dead, 5,600 missing, more than 15,000 people injured and 500,000 homeless
(Jayaratne, 2005). Most affected sectors included coastal livelihoods dependent largely on
fisheries, tourism, agriculture and small businesses. Total job losses are estimated at 380,000. The
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estimated damage to infrastructure includes 150,000 homes, 200 educational institutions and 100
health facilities. Railway, power, telecommunications, water supply, and fishing ports also
suffered significant damage. In addition to the deepened poverty for thousands already suffering
from over two decades of war, the long-term impact includes an additional 250,000 people will
falling below the poverty line. The Government of Sri Lanka and international financial
institutions estimate reconstruction will cost US$1.6 billion, primarily to rebuild key coastal
infrastructure and re-establish livelihoods (Jayaratne, 2005).
The resulting damage to lives and property has ironically brought in a new chapter in the
CSR practices of Sri Lankan business organisations. We turn to these post-tsunami CSR practices
after the methodology section.

METHODOLOGY
Data Collection
The paper is based on a larger study of my experiences as a Sri Lankan born expatriate-academic,
researching into post-tsunami leadership behaviour, both in Sri Lanka and internationally, and 21
interviews I had with formal and informal donors, civil society leaders, business leaders and
victims of the Asian tsunami. Interviews provided a rich context and helped to develop diverse
perspectives of the tsunami related CSR activities. This paper is based on four interviews. It
provides input on how the top management of two leading Sri Lankan private sector organisations
engaged in CSR initiatives during the first 11-months after the Asian tsunami. The fieldwork was
conducted during the latter half of November 2005; nearly 11 months after the tsunami struck the
Sri Lankan coast.
The primary method of data collection was in-depth, face-to-face interviews. A semistructured interview guide was used. The average participant interview was about 90 minutes. In
the interview, participants were encouraged to reflect upon what the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami
meant to them and how it has influenced their leadership and decision-making on natural disaster
related CSR initiatives. To observe moods and hesitancies in response to specific questions, all
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interviews were videotaped. Additional probing questions were interwoven during each interview
to seek verification and explanation. To seek the participants’ perspectives on the phenomenon
under study, the interview guide was based on an open-ended format. This format was used to
encourage participants to share information in a style that they were comfortable with.
According to Miles and Huberman (1994), the key to ensuring the quality of data in a
study of this type is to link three levels of understanding—(i) the meanings and interpretations of
the participants; (ii) the researcher’s interpretation of those meanings; and (iii) confirmatory
analysis. Unfortunately, this linking process cannot be made explicit in this paper because data
collection was governed by a confidentiality agreement. Data triangulation was, therefore, used to
ensure the quality of the data, together with multiple methods of confirmatory analysis including
methodological triangulation (Seale, 2000).
With respect to data triangulation, to strengthen and verify the use of the interview data,
additional information was sought through the review of relevant company and public documents.
These consisted of company reports on CSR initiatives, as well as electronic and print media
reports on business leaders’ and organisations’ tsunami related CSR activities.
Case Descriptions
Unilever (Sri Lanka)

Unilever (Sri Lanka) is among the largest and oldest multinational companies in Sri Lanka. It has
operated in Sri Lanka for over 70 years and employs over 1100 Sri Lankans, none of whom
succumbed to the tsunami. The company currently conducts a wide range of FMCG operations in
Sri Lanka’s urban and rural sectors. The interviews were conducted with two of the most senior
directors and one junior director in the top management team. It was one of the few Colombobased organisations that had a formal CSR programme before the tsunami.
Brandix

A family owned apparel manufacturer, Brandix is supported by over 20 manufacturing facilities
in Sri Lanka and abroad, as well as marketing offices in New York and London. It is the single
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largest exporter in Sri Lanka with an annual turnover that exceeds US$200 million. It directly
employs 18,500 and generates indirect employment to an equivalent number. The interview was
conducted with the Chief Executive Officer of the company. It is also one of the large Colombo
based organisations that had a formal CSR programme before the tsunami.

FINDINGS:

MANAGING

PROFITS,

PUBLICITY

AND

SPONTANEOUS

EMOTION
All interviewees described the post tsunami experience using the phrase ‘CSR’. Both companies
had formal CSR initiatives in place. For Unilever (Sri Lanka), it revolved around the 3G mantra,
our brands, our people and our community. Reflecting the worldwide corporate mission of
Unilever Plc, adding vitality to life, Unilever (Sri Lanka) attempted to deliver positive results to
the community when pursuing its brand and people goals. Both organisations admitted that they
‘played to their strengths’, meaning shaping the tsunami CSR response in terms of proven
organisational resources and techniques, or internal tools. For Unilever (Sri Lanka), it was the
strong and deep island wide distribution network. In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami,
Unilever (Sri Lanka) moved quickly to make distribution networks available to emergency relief
operations, working alongside local agencies to distribute essential food and hygiene products,
and matched employee donations to a central fund. Initial relief work was followed by
rehabilitation and reconstruction projects. These include the rebuilding of 150 homes in Sri
Lanka.
Brandix’s key internal tool was their already established CSR initiatives on water based
projects. Brandix believes in providing water to as many needy communities as possible. Brandix
engineering teams have constructed and maintained desalination plants in strategically located
areas along the southern and western coastal belt. The process is two-fold: firstly, they convert
sea water into fresh, drinkable water, and secondly, distribute this to the local populace through
efficient and effective mechanisms available (Brandix, 2006). Brandix’s long-term corporate
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social responsibility programme is to build new desalination plants every year. During the
aftermath of the tsunami, they found that most of the water wells in the affected areas were
contaminated with sea water. With the help of a government agency and in-house environmental
engineers, Brandix cleaned 4000 water wells along the whole of the affected coastal belt. The
CEO of Brandix believes that this CSR initiative cuts across all ethnic and religious communities.
All interviewees elaborated on the nature of decision-making and leadership that was
required to effectively and efficiently channel organisational resources to the most wanted.
According to the Brandix leader, decision-making was hard. He said;
These (tsunami related CSR decisions) were similar to the decisions I had to make under
terrorist threats on my life to close down the factories and delay shipments. Then I had
to make the call, and I did. At the time, we had never experienced any thing like that
before.
Amongst the outpouring of emotions and spontaneity ‘to do something’, he admitted of being
accused by his employees of making cold business calls during the aftermath of the tsunami
disaster. For example, he said;
I had to make hard decisions. There was panic and I was concerned about wasting
resources. I had to order everyone to work and meet the shipping deadlines because
in the apparel industry, missing deadlines is committing suicide. A small group of
employees were reluctant because they thought it was a hard, cold commercial
decision. But for me, grief without a plan is more grief. While the factories were
running, I decided that some employees should form into teams and we should go to
those areas that no one has been to. So we sent several teams in a convoy carrying
tents and basic emergency items to neglected areas especially in the East.
Similarly, Unilever (Sri Lanka) directors believed in ‘nuturing the golden goose’ whilst
continuing with emergency relief efforts. The senior directors made a decision to get back to
work, keep the factories running whilst emergency help was being provided. With its strong
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distribution network perhaps no other Sri Lankan organisation could boast of, Unilever (Sri
Lanka) employees traveled to remote areas and were the first to get to most of the Eastern towns.
They assisted the World Food Programme in logistical support by chartering a train to deliver
emergency food rations and medical supplies.
As a driver of CSR initiatives connected with the tsunami, publicity became a contentious
topic in all interviews. According to the Unilever (Sri Lanka) senior team, they wanted to do the
‘right thing’. Right in terms of providing what is appropriate to the affected people and right
according to their conscience. The question they tried to answer was given the same resources,
whether they would engage in the same activities in a similar manner if they were carried out
outside the ‘corporate hat’. Initially, they decided that Unilever (Sri Lanka) should not use the
tsunami CSR initiatives for enhancing the corporate image. However, according to the senior
management team, in the absence of any publicity to their CSR initiatives, their stakeholders,
both national and international, had wanted to know Unilever (Sri Lanka)’s contribution to the
tsunami relief effort. There had been increasing pressure from these stakeholders because some
have channeled their resources through the company to direct them to affected areas. For
example, ex-employees who were living abroad have sent funds to Unilever (Sri Lanka) to be
used in the relief effort. Hence, Unilever (Sri Lanka) became concerned with the situation and
decided to engage in ‘stakeholder awareness’. According to the management team, ‘the Board
decided to engage in focused awareness of our efforts as opposed to a shotgun approach’. They
felt that this was appropriate because it was ‘more of a responsibility to account for our
stakeholders than a strategy to exploit the tsunami for cheap commercial gain’. One senior
director said;
As much as we didn’t want to wave a flag, we needed to do the right thing by our
conscience as well as seen doing the right thing because our stakeholders were
expecting us to be seen. Stakeholders had to see the right thing been done--corporate
image was important.
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Thus the leadership at Unilever (Sri Lanka) had to adopt a careful awareness building campaign
which did not exploit the human tragedy as an opportunity for publicity but at the same time
ensuring that ‘the company image was not adversely affected of not being seen to be doing’. Thus
a quarter of the initial 100 million LKR received from the parent company was donated to the
government and ‘we decided to take whatever publicity that came with it because it was
important that the government recognised the efforts of leading multinationals in the country.’
In terms of leadership challenges posed by tsunami related CSR initiatives, all leaders
admitted that the fundamentals of leading were similar to resolving a day-to-day business crisis.
However, they mentioned that the approach of influencing their followers were different. The
Brandix leader explained: ‘Leadership was the key, nobody wanted to take decisions. Emotions
were raw and I had to be more empathetic and tolerant of their spontaneity’. For example when
he decided to organise and send one convoy to all the affected areas, ‘the heads of different SBUs
reacted. They wanted to send their people to where they had factories so their presence was felt in
those communities. I had to give in’.
In terms of the emotion and spontaneity that was involved in the CSR initiatives of the
organisations, Brandix CEO said when all 18500 followers were thinking of achieving the same
goal, the intense emotions and spontaneity ‘has to be managed, to say the least’. These sentiments
were echoed by the Unilever (Sri Lanka) senior team as well. Reflecting the parent company’s
mission of adding vitality to life, ‘we in Sri Lanka decided that all our activities directed to
achieve successes in our brands and people should also have a positive impact on our
communities’. So, in terms of leadership challenges, one senior director said, ‘the tsunami related
CSR initiatives nicely fitted in with the G3 mantra already in place’. However, he said that the
emotions and the spontaneity had to be clearly directed.
The spontaneity in which people responded to the disaster was overwhelming. It
came from the heart; non-rationalised outpouring of action. No overtime was claimed
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by anyone of the employees for the massive number of hours put in for the relief
work.
He admitted that he had not ‘led something like this before, ever. It was a far more emotional
experience’. Contrasting ‘normal’ company events as ‘a job to be done where tasks are more
rational and structured’, this senior Unilever (Sri Lanka) director said, ‘here it was all heart, came
from within.’ Whilst curtailing spontaneity, he said;
…the unique leadership challenge in this disaster related CSR was to how to get the
best out of the overwhelming desire to help. Guidance, structure and a clinical
management approach was needed. Clear direction and clarity to the purpose at hand
had to be provided immediately.
In terms of personal reflections, he said;
Two words--fulfillment and a sense of frustration! There is a limit to how much we
could do and the frustration we felt consequently with government bureaucracy. For
example, we got LKR100 million in a matter of hours but government approval is
still pending after 11 months. We haven’t been able to handover a single house yet.

These findings are summarized in Table 1.
TABLE 1

DISCUSSION: DRIVERS, INTERNAL TOOLS, COMPANY EXPECTATIONS
AND GENUINENESS
It was earlier noted that Våland and Heide’s (2005) views were limited to company created ‘bad
episodes’. The present study extends their model to explain CSR initiatives to externally caused
‘bad episodes’ affecting the whole community.
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According to Våland and Heide (2005), a corporate social responsibility event passes
through three ‘regulators’ which influence the significance of the episode (Figure 1).
FIGURE 1. Våland and Heide’s Conceptual Model
The CSR drivers, internal tools and enablers constitute regulators, which may reduce or amplify
the effects of the CSR response. In some company created situations, the impact of the CSR event
may nearly untraceable because public media show no interest in the episode or because the
company has the necessary tools to defuse the situation. In other circumstances, the incident may
cause a significant uproar because it is illegal or in conflict with internal rules of conduct, and
ends up as a headline story (Våland and Heide, 2005).
CSR drivers lead to increased emphasis on CSR (see Figure 1). Increased awareness
among stakeholders, public media interest and more integration/higher interdependencies
between companies are some examples. Companies are facing growing expectations that they
measure, report and continuously improve their social, environmental and ethical performance
(Våland and Heide, 2005). Growing public media interest tends to reinforce the stakeholder
awareness. More integration and higher interdependencies between actors mean that firms are
increasingly held accountable for the practices of their business partners throughout the value
chain. Thus, a CSR event which occurs in the upstream part of the supply chain, can easily lead to
a flow-on effect for the actors further down in the chain (Våland and Heide, 2005). For example,
by contributing 100million LKR within a matter of hours after the tsunami struck Sri Lanka,
Unilever’s top management in the UK head office played a major role in initiating and setting the
tone of the Unilever (Sri Lanka)’ CSR response.
CSR Internal Tools refer to the firm’s own rules, processes and structures that safeguard
a ‘socially responsible’ company (Våland and Heide, 2005). Literature shows that companies
differ in the way they implement corporate social responsibility. Some companies concentrate on
a single area such as environmental and ethical issues while others aim to integrate a CSR vision
into all aspects of their operations.
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CSR Enablers are generally designed to support, measure, assist in implementation and
enhance accountability for corporate performance on CSR issues (Våland and Heide, 2005). In
this context, these researchers distinguish between several types of CSR enablers; conventions
and standards, codes of conduct and law, provisions and court decisions. Depending on the
significance of the episode, Våland and Heide (2005) outline three responsive strategies.
One is to follow a ‘management strategy’ by applying existing CSR internal tools. This
option is generally preferred when the CSR incident is sufficiently small to be managed and
employees in the company basically agree towards the response. If the management strategy fails,
the researchers propose a second option; ‘surgery strategy’. Normally used for more significant
incidents, surgical action may result in significant changes to the processes and people of the
organisation. If the surgery strategy fails, Våland and Heide (2005) propose the need of a
‘mitigation strategy’. This strategy is used for more severe incidents, such as a large
environmental disaster, where the focus is on managing the external variables.
Compared to Våland and Heide’s (2005) model, the proposed model has a sharper focus
on the intent of CSR initiatives (see Figure 2). Thus, instead of Våland and Heide’s (2005)
‘company outcome’, the proposed model introduces ‘company expectation’ to determine the
intent of CSR initiatives. Also, Våland and Heide’s (2005) study on company’s CSR initiatives
towards a critical incident has been one of magnitude. In the case of an externally caused, high
magnitude ‘bad episode’ such as the Asian tsunami, there is little or no relevance of ‘enablers’
such as external codes, standards, indicators and guidelines produced for business by
governmental and other agencies. Thus the proposed model has left out ‘enablers’ as a ‘regulator’
to explain the tsunami related CSR initiatives.
After the Asian tsunami struck Sri Lanka on Sunday, 26 December 2004, each of the two
organisations initiated CSR programmes. However, each organisation’s CSR response and
outcomes were different. For example, while Unilever (Sri Lanka)’s focus on CSR was
community based projects, Brandix’s focus was on environmental CSR. It can be expected that
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firms will attempt to balance economic, legal and ethical considerations situation by situation and
therefore, will react differently. It seems that Unilever (Sri Lanka) and Brandix presumably
developed their post-tsunami CSR initiatives based on the aggregation of firms’ differing
resources and capabilities (a resource based interpretation). Based on Våland and Heide (2005),
the findings are illustrated in Figure 2.
FIGURE 2. Genuineness in CSR Initiatives
It appears that the CSR responses of the two organisations in the wake of the Asian
tsunami were regulated by two different factors. Publicity became a major driver in the posttsunami CSR initiatives. Both organisations faced moral challenges in dealing with publicity due
to the colossal damage to lives and property. The process of resolving this dilemma and the final
CSR outcome signify the genuineness or moral intent of the company which is best reflected
through the company’s expectations (Figure 2). This issue is further examined later. In terms of
the other regulator, internal tools, both organisations had established formal CSR platforms. They
used their nationally and internationally acclaimed CSR programmes to develop their tsunami
related CSR initiatives.
Based on the company expectations, the outcomes from the tsunami related CSR
initiatives taken during the first 11 months could be classified into emergency (t0-t1), short-term
(t1-t2) and long-term (t2-t3) (see Figure 2). In the first 11 months after the tsunami, apart from the
emergency relief during the first few weeks, almost all of the CSR initiatives of the two
organisations were directed at improving the social development and the livelihood of those
affected by the tsunami. These included construction of houses, hospitals, schools and water
wells.
Depending on the significance of the episode and influence of the regulators, Våland and
Heide (2005) suggest that company CSR initiatives could be management, surgical or mitigative
(see Figure 1). While the focus of Våland and Heide’s (2005) study on company’s CSR initiatives
towards a critical incident has been one of magnitude, during the immediate aftermath of the
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tsunami tragedy, the focus was one of immediacy of response. Because Våland and Heide’s
(2005) management strategies could be implemented with existing CSR internal tools and with
almost complete agreement of all employees, most of the tsunami related CSR initiatives
undertaken by Unilever (Sri Lanka) and Brandix during the first 11 months seem to be based on
management strategies.
In terms of the genuineness behind the CSR initiatives of the two organisations, drivers
such as publicity became a contentious topic in all interviews. The findings suggest that the need
for, and the extent of publicity, created a major moral dilemma to the decision-makers of
Unilever (Sri Lanka) and Brandix. The process of resolving this dilemma and the final CSR
outcome signify the genuineness or moral intent of the company, and is best reflected in the
company’s expectations (Figure 2).
As pointed out earlier, if organisational virtuousness is necessary for the genuineness of
Unilever (Sri Lanka) and Brandix’s CSR initiatives, we can examine the place of human impact,
moral goodness and unconditional social benefit—the three definitional attributes of
organisational virtuousness—in the companies’ post-tsunami CSR initiatives. In an episode such
as the Asian tsunami tragedy which caused severe loss to property and lives, the place of human
impact in the CSR initiatives is relatively easier to detect. There is little doubt that the CSR
activities of Unilever (Sri Lanka) and Brandix had a significant impact on improving the living
conditions, well-being and the resilience of the tsunami affected people. For example, according
to the Unilever (Sri Lanka) top management, even the provision of a simple but multipurpose
utensil such as a plastic bucket in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami had made a significant
improvement to the living conditions of the affected people.
Considering the role of the second attribute of organisational virtuousness, the moral
goodness of the two companies’ CSR initiatives is subject to much difficulty (Park and Peterson,
2003). But organisations demonstrating this attribute would initiate CSR activities because it was
the ‘right thing to do’ (Bright, 2006). Several interviewees spoke of doing the right thing—right
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in terms of the affected individual’s perspective and from one’s own conscience. The findings
reveal the significant role a human tragedy plays in shaping top management’s desire to make
‘right’ decisions, and support Shakun’s (2001) notion of unbounded rationality.
He proposes that decisions are bound not only by cognitive abilities but also by affective
and conative faculties. Conation refers to the connection of knowledge and affect to behaviour,
and is associated with the question of ‘why?’ something has happened. It is the personal,
intentional, goal-oriented or striving component of motivation—the proactive (as opposed to
reactive or habitual) aspect of behaviour (Fernando and Jackson, 2006). It is defined as the use of
will or the freedom to make choices about what to do. According to Huitt (1999), conation
becomes critical when an individual wants to successfully engage in self-direction and selfregulation. This was evident in the Unilever (Sri Lanka) interviews when the board took the
decision not to seek publicity, a decision taken with ‘all heart’. However, with increasing pressure
from stakeholders, ‘all heart’ decisions were later ‘balanced’ by rational decisions when the board
decided to mount a ‘stakeholder awareness campaign’.
The final attribute of organisational virtuousness is unconditionality of social benefits,
which according to Bright (2006) is the ‘intention to create goods of first intent and to prudently
use goods of second intent to instrumentally bring benefit to society’ (p.753). The key task of
assessing the genuineness of company expectations seems to rest on whether an organisation’s
CSR activities are intended to create goods of first intent (a virtuous pursuit) or to create goods of
second intent (an instrumental pursuit) (Bright, 2006, p. 752). Using Aristotelian explanation on
ethics, Bright (2006) elaborates that ‘goods of first intent’; a chief good which is in itself is
worthy of pursuit, such as concern for others and common good, refer to virtuousness (p.752). On
the other hand, the pursuit of goods of second intent refers to those that are good for the ‘sake of
obtaining something else such as profit, prestige and power’ (ibid), and is amoral. For example,
the Unilever (Sri Lanka) senior management’s initial reaction was to initiate CSR activities and
generate only goods of first intent. However, with competing stakeholder needs (Godfrey, 2005 &
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2006), Unilever (Sri Lanka) was compelled to ‘take whatever publicity’ associated with the
donation of a quarter of the initial 100 million LKR received from the parent company to the Sri
Lankan government, a good of second intent.
The findings do not reveal that at any stage the two organisations’ expectations were
exclusively based on the pursuit of goods of second intent as an end in itself. The findings suggest
that at least in the immediate aftermath (t0-t1) of an unexpected and high magnitude human
tragedy caused by nature, driven by the need to spontaneously react to the outpouring of emotion
largely reduced the likelihood for generating purely second intent goods. However, in the long
run, driven by market forces and ingratiation (Bright, 2006), it is possible that organisations will
increasingly adopt surgical and mitigative strategies to exploit externally caused ‘bad episodes’ to
pursue purely second order goods.

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The comparative analysis of the post-tsunami CSR activities of Unilever (Sri Lanka) and Brandix
has several implications for CSR theory and practice. Based on the findings, we might conclude
that in the post-tsunami t0-t1 period, faced with a high magnitude human tragedy created by
nature, organisations’ CSR initiatives are more likely to be shaped by ‘management strategies’
that generate a high level of genuineness. This assertion however could change due to several
factors such as the passage of time since the ‘bad episode’. Although decision-making was mostly
based on unbounded rationality during the first 11 months after the disaster, it is likely that in the
short to long term, driven by ingratiation, surgical and mitigative strategies will play a significant
role in shaping the organisations’ CSR outcomes, which in turn is likely to reduce the level of
genuineness.
Although geographically and culturally, the context of this research was limited to the
views of the top management of two prominent Sri Lankan based organisations, this study raises
important questions for future research on CSR. Future research could test the findings of this
study from the perspectives of other stakeholders—such as employees, shareholders, beneficiaries
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of CSR activities, customers and suppliers. This inquiry could also be widened to include other
participant and industry profiles such as non-managerial staff and organisations from public and
not-for profit sector.
The conceptual model was captured at a given point in time. A longitudinal research
study should highlight how genuineness of CSR initiatives changes in response to time. A
planned follow-up study on the third anniversary of the tsunami will further examine the
genuineness of the two organisations’ tsunami related CSR initiatives. This follow-up study could
reveal the influence passage of time has on maintaining the moral intent of the CSR initiatives
undertaken during the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, and the role of surgical and mitigative
response strategies on genuineness. Some studies could also examine the cross-cultural
application of the findings with the post-tsunami related CSR initiatives of organisations
operating in the West. Lastly, studies could focus on the decision-making process concerning the
exclusive pursuit of goods of second intent, and its effect on reputation, genuineness and longterm profits.
In sum, the comparative analysis of the two case studies suggests that organisational
virtuousness could demonstrate the two organisations’ genuineness of the tsunami related CSR
initiatives taken during the immediate aftermath of the tragedy. The idea of virtuousness as a
necessary condition of genuineness in corporate philanthropy is in an embryonic stage and
several issues regarding frameworks, measurements and empirical methods are yet to be
developed and tested. One significant challenge would be developing constructs and
measurements to assess the moral goodness of the organisations. A possible avenue to overcome
this challenge would be to examine the role of individual and group spirituality in shaping CSR
initiatives.

20

Acknowledgment: The author would like to express his gratitude to the Editor in Chief,

Hervé Laroche for his exemplary editorship and two anonymous reviewers for their very
helpful feedback on an earlier draft of this paper.

21

REFERENCES
Asian Tribune (2005) Sri Lanka crosses US$ 1,000 per capita mark, accessed at
http://www.asiantribune.com/oldsite/show_news.php?id=14297 on 24 November
2006.
Brandix (2006) Brandix Home page, accessed at http://brandix.com on 24 November 2006.
Bright, D. (2006) Dialogue, Virtuousness is necessary for genuineness in corporate philanthropy,
Academy of Management Review, 31, 3, 752-754.
Bright, D., Cameron, K., and Caza, A. (2006) The amplifying and buffering effects of
virtuousness in downsized organizations. Journal of Business Ethics, 64, 3, 249-269.
Cameron, K., Bright, D. and Caza, A. (2004) Exploring the relationships between organizational
virtuousness and performance. American Behavioural Scientist, 47, 6, 766-790.
Carroll, A. (1999) Corporate social responsibility: Evolution of a definitional construct.
Business and Society, 38, 3, 268–295.
Carroll, A. (1979) A three-dimensional conceptual model of corporate social performance.
Academy of Management Review, 4, 4, 497–505.
Fernando, M. and Jackson, B. (2006) The Influence of Religion-based Workplace Spirituality on
Business Leaders’ Decision-Making: An Inter-Faith Study, The Journal of Management
and Organization, 12, 1, 23-39.
Godfrey, P. (2006) Dialogue, A reply to Bright: Virtuousness and the virtues of the market.
Academy of Management Review, 31, 3, 754-756.
Godfrey, P. (2005) The relationship between corporate philanthropy and shareholder wealth: A
risk management perspective. Academy of Management Review, 30, 4, 777-798.
Huitt, W. (1999) Conation as an important factor of mind. Educational Psychology Interactive,
accessed at http://chiron.valdosta.edu/whuitt/col/regsys/conation.html on 4 June 2005.

22

International Alert (2005) Peace through profit: Sri Lankan perspectives on corporate social
responsibility, accessed at http://www.international-alert.org/policy/business.htm on
5th April 2006.
Jayaratne, C. (2005) From tsunami to re-awakening: Post-disaster experience of Sri Lanka’s
civil

society

organizations,

Asia

Pacific

Philanthropy

Consortium

Annual

Conference, Phuket, Thailand.
Liu, P. et al (2005) Observations by the International Tsunami Survey Team in Sri Lanka,
Science, 10 June 2005, 308, 1595.
Miles, M. and Huberman, M. (1994) Qualitative Data Analysis, Sage, London.
Park, N. and Peterson, C. (2003) Virtues and organizations, in K. S. Cameron, J. E. Dutton and
R. E. Quinn (eds.), Positive Organizational Scholarship: Foundations of a New
Discipline, Berrett Koehler, San Francisco.
Seale, C. (2000) The Quality of Qualitative Research, Sage: London.
Shakun, M. (2001) Unbounded rationality, Group Decision and Negotiation, 10, 2, 97-118.
Våland, T. and Heide, M. (2005) Corporate social responsiveness: Exploring the dynamics of
bad episodes, European Management Journal, 23, 5, 495-506.
Windsor, D. (2001) The future of corporate social responsibility, International Journal of
Organizational Analysis, 9, 3, 225–257.

23

TABLE 1: Summary of events leading to disaster related CSR outcomes
Unilever

Brandix

Within 24 hours

Board meeting

Board meeting

Initial Fund

100

million

LKR

from

parent None

company
Decision-making

Informal gathering of directors and Board Meeting
employees

Employee involvement

Voluntary donation of a day’s wage, Voluntary employee time
voluntary time

Short-term CSR outcomes

25 million

Emergency
marooned

Emergency aid to the furthest corners
of the island
Long-term CSR outcomes

for

employees,
employee

teams,

tents

75 million
Building

volunteer

hotlines

Water wells
150

houses,

hospital

refurbishment, logistical support to
the World Food Programme
Integrated relief efforts 3G mantra: our community

Water: 4000 water wells

with the existing CSR
platform
Stronger ties with NGOs 25 million to government, logistical South African Charity
and government

support to World Food Programme
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FIGURE 1. Våland and Heide’s (2005) Conceptual Model

Reprinted from European Management Journal 23, T. Våland and M. Heide, Corporate social
responsiveness: Exploring the dynamics of

bad episodes, p.499, Copyright (2005), with

permission from Elsevier
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FIGURE 2. Genuineness in CSR Initiatives
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